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Abstract
The aim of the paper is to consider the implications of applying the enactive approach to cognition 
within the study of religions. This approach is discussed as an alternative to the classical, cognitiv-
ist stance predominant among the proponents of cognitive science of religion (CSR). The most 
popular model within CSR is that of cognition as manipulation of concepts. The key assumptions of 
this model limit the understanding of religion to a system of beliefs. Applying an alternative model 
– of cognition as enaction – may contribute to creating a more comprehensive model of religion, 
taking into consideration its pre-conceptual origins. Using the category of representation as the 
departure point, the author juxtaposes the cognitivist and the enactive stance, showing how substi-
tuting the former with the latter necessarily changes the construal of religious activity and thinking.
Key words: cognitive science of religion, enactivism, embodied cognition, representationism, 
ritual, religions of India
Słowa kluczowe: religioznawstwo kognitywne, enaktywizm, poznanie ucieleśnione, reprezenta­
cjonizm, rytuał, religie Indii
1 There are a few reasons for the use of term cognitive study of religions in the title, instead of the 
generally accepted cognitive science of religion (CSR). First, the author is a scholar of religions attempt-
ing to apply the cognitive stance, and not a cognitive scientist studying religion. Therefore in the phrase in 
question the term study of religions is the departure point, while the adjective cognitive is its qualifier. 
Secondly, the author has no ambition whatsoever to be a scientist, and has serious doubts whether re-
ligion can be thoroughly explained through science at all. Lastly, CSR has become a household phrase 
associated with a particular theory of religion grounded in a particular model of mentality and cognition. 
Since the approach proposed in this paper does not make use of this model, it does not place the present 
discussion within the field of CSR in a strict sense.
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Introduction
Cognitive science of religion (CSR) has gained a strong presence in the academic 
milieu in recent years. It has been praised by many for providing what seems like an 
easily operationalised theory of religion. It has also been scorned by equally many 
for advocating a simplified – if not simplistic – model of religion. As the advocates 
of CSR keep devising new experiments to verify their theses, and its opponents ques-
tion the explanatory value of such pursuits, it is important to realise that the model of 
religion proposed by CSR is not the only option available within the cognitive para-
digm. If one steps back and changes the applied model of cognition, it becomes not 
only possible, but in fact necessary to rethink religion from scratch. The purpose of 
this paper is to suggest how the basic assumptions about religion must be rephrased, 
when the understanding of cognition changes from cognitivist to enactive. The cen-
tral category in the discussion is that of representation, here understood simply as 
a cognitive system’s internal construal of an external phenomenon.
Cognitivism: localised minds and cognition as representation
All the dominant views on religion within CSR are grounded in so-called cognitivism,2 
according to which the mind is a localised, virtual entity, and cognition is computa-
tional processing of mental representations. This model is implicit not only in the 
classical view advocated by Pascal Boyer,3 Scott Atran4 and their descendants, but 
also in such modified views as the one proposed by Armin W. Geertz.5 The ground-
work for cognitivism was provided by Jerry Fodor, who over three decades ago pro-
claimed that the “typical function of cognitive mechanisms is the transformation of 
mental representations.”6 Fodor described a tripartite structure of mental process-
es. Input systems register perceptual information and analyse it, supplying represen-
tations of the environment. Transducers change the format of these representations, 
making them available for further processing. Central processes are responsible for 
problem solving based on the transduced information from the input systems and on 
background knowledge. Such problem solving involves computation based on “best 
2 See F. Varela, E.T. Thompson, E. Rosch, The Embodied Mind. Cognitive Science and Human Ex-
perience, Cambridge 1991, pp. 7 ff.
3 P. Boyer, The Naturalness of Religious Ideas: A Cognitive Theory of Religion, Berkeley 1994; 
idem, Religion Explained. The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thoughts, New York 2001.
4 S. Atran, In Gods We Trust. The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion, Oxford 2002.
5 See A.W. Geertz, Brain, Body and Culture: A Biocultural Theory of Religion, “Method and Theory 
in the Study of Religion” 2010, 22, pp. 304–321. This claim will be elaborated further on. Even though 
Geertz endorses embodied cognition, his approach is in fact a variety of cognitivism, referred to by Daniel 
D. Hutto and Erik Myin as Conservative Embodied Cognition (see D.D. Hutto, E. Myin, Radicalizing 
Enactivism. Basic Minds without Content, Cambridge, MA 2013, pp. 9 ff.).
6 J.A. Fodor, The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology, Cambridge, MA 1983, 
p. 13.
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hypotheses,”7 and results in “fixation of belief.”8 What is notable in this model is that 
perception (passive acquiring of fixed information from the environment) and cogni-
tion (processing of that information) are construed as distinct processes. Secondly, 
the mind’s stance is deemed propositional (i.e. the involved representations are be-
lieved to have assigned truth-value). 
An important notion for the proponents of classical CSR is that of the modular-
ity of mind. First advanced by Fodor,9 it meant that some input systems function as 
modules – they are specialised computational mechanisms hardwired in the brain, 
processing information coming from distinct perceptual domains. It is noteworthy 
that Fodor postulates separate input systems for processing linguistic information – 
e.g. he suggests that some auditory modules might be responsible for “assign[ing] 
grammatical descriptions to token utterances.”10 What this means is that linguistic 
processing (or at least parts thereof) is placed at the same level of cognition as, for ex-
ample, other forms of auditory analysis. Linguistic cognition is construed as a distinct 
process initiated already at the level of input analysis in modules especially assigned 
to perform the task.
The most important features of input modules are their domain-specificity (they 
are specialised to process a limited range of information) and encapsulation (they are 
insulated from other modules and from non-perceptual background knowledge). 
Moreover, their development proceeds according to endogenously determined pat-
terns – “mental architecture is innately specified and... the ontogeny of cognition is 
primarily the unfolding of a genetic program.”11 In other words, the modularity of 
mind is fixed by evolution.
According to Fodor, modularity does not extend onto central processes.12 The lat-
ter are general problem-solvers, whose operation is sensitive to external phenomena. 
They are isotropic (they draw inferences based on input from different input systems) 
and Quineian (their output is sensitive to the outputs of all input systems). This view 
was challenged by Dan Sperber, according to whom both perceptual and conceptual 
processes (the latter compared to Fodor’s central processes) are modular.13 The trick 
is that perceptual and conceptual domains simply do not overlap – domain-specific 
conceptual mechanisms get their inputs from several input mechanisms. Thus, they 
remain informationally encapsulated, “while chains of inference [...] take a concep-
tual premise from one module to the next [...] integrat[ing] the contribution of each in 
some final conclusion.”14 Although innately determined, conceptual modules exhibit 
certain plasticity. More general modules (e.g. specialised in living-kind recognition) 
may produce more specialised micro-modules (e.g. specialised in recognition of dogs 
7 Ibidem, p. 104.
8 Ibidem, p. 46.
9 Ibidem, pp. 47 ff.
10 Ibidem, p. 47.
11 Ibidem, p. 35.
12 Ibidem, pp. 101 ff.
13 D. Sperber, Explaining Culture. A Naturalistic Approach, Oxford 1996, pp. 119–150.
14 Ibidem, p. 133.
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or humans).15 Moreover, even though conceptual modules have their evolutionarily 
assigned proper domains, they may be triggered by (potentially much broader) actual 
domains. Sometimes proper domains may be altogether removed from the environ-
ment, so actual domains no longer overlap with them.
To summarise the cognitivist stance, it presents the mind as a localised virtual 
machine, and cognition as localised manipulation of representations of a pre-given 
world. The outcomes of cognition – beliefs – are propositional in nature. Finally, 
algorithms for cognition are evolutionarily acquired and innate – the contents pro-
cessed may change, but not the algorithms themselves. In a nutshell, cognition is 
theorising (even if automatic and inaccessible to the theoriser’s awareness), which 
may potentially be followed by action (if the belief acquired as a result of this theoris-
ing asks for one).
Religion according to cognitivism: representing that which isn’t
The length of this paper does not allow for a detailed discussion of the cognitivist 
understanding of religion. But since literature devoted to the topic is abundant, a brief 
summary seems sufficient. According to classical CSR, religion is a commitment 
to a socially shared system of representations of a specific kind. Religious repre-
sentations are of anthropomorphic,16 moderately counterintuitive (MCI) agents with 
unlimited access to strategic information,17 reigning over human existential anxie-
ties, such as death and deception.18 With such definition of religion, the key problem 
that needs solving is that religious propositions (e.g. anthropomorphic gods exists 
and control our lives) are counterfactual. In other words, explaining religion means 
explaining why there is a widespread commitment to representations of something 
that isn’t. The explanation offered is that religious representations are parasitic of 
our hardwired mental susceptibilities (i.e. by-products of dispositions selected during 
evolution).19 To put it bluntly, religion is an inevitable consequence of fairly rigid, 
unreflective, biologically constrained modes of thinking.
The above does not mean that the cognitivist approach ignores the practical aspect 
of religion. As Boyer acknowledges, “religion is a rather practical thing,”20 by which 
he means that it involves forms of activity aimed at fulfilling particular needs. But the 
interpretation of this activity is determined by the representationalist stance: religious 
15 Sperber’s proposal opposes the experimentally confirmed model of concept formation proposed 
by Eleanor Rosch (See E. Rosch, Principles of Categorization [in:] Concepts. Core Readings, E. Margo-
lis, S. Laurence (eds.), Cambridge, MA 1999 [1976], pp. 189–206). According to Rosch, the most basic 
categories acquired during ontogeny are middle-level categories (e.g. dog or cat). More abstract, super-
ordinate categories (such as animal or living organism) are developed through generalisation on the basis 
of the basic ones. Notably, Fodor supports Rosch’s model (J.A. Fodor, op. cit., p. 94). 
16 See S. Guthrie, Faces in the Clouds. A New Theory of Religion, Oxford 1993.
17 See P. Boyer, Religion Explained...
18 See S. Atran, op. cit.
19 See D. Sperber, op. cit., pp. 80 ff.
20 P. Boyer, Religion Explained..., p. 138.
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rituals are a consequence of representing gods, ancestors and other culturally postu-
lated beings as MCI agents. They are forms of interactions with these agents deter-
mined by the way they are construed. 
A renowned cognitivist account of ritual is that offered by Robert McCauley and 
E. Thomas Lawson. According to the authors’ theory of ritual competence,21 repre-
senting ritual action employs the same system as representing action in general. This 
system, however, is supplemented by representations of so-called culturally postu-
lated superhuman (CPS) agents, who may play the role of special agents or special 
patients in different ritual contexts.22 In this interpretation, religious representations 
precede (and justify) ritual performance, and the notion of representation (of par-
ticular entities and general actions) plays a central role. Once again, first comes the 
thinking, then the acting.
The account of ritual proposed by Harvey Whitehouse takes on a different per-
spective.23 The author acknowledges the pro-social aspect of religion and ritual, seek-
ing a relation between different modes of religiosity and the development of differ-
ent economic and political systems. According to Whitehouse, the imagistic mode 
involves sporadic, highly arousing rituals, during which doctrines are transmitted as 
iconic imagery through triggering episodic memory.24 In doctrinal mode, on the other 
hand, a propositional body of doctrines is transmitted through regular, routinised wor-
ship involving low stimulation, and triggering semantic memory. While the former 
mode may induce identity fusion and support the hunter-gatherer economy, the latter, 
through promoting group identification, supports agriculture-based economies.25 All 
in all, this account presents ritual as a subsidiary mechanism, supporting different 
modes of representation (imagistic vs propositional) and routes of reflection. Even if 
emotion-inducing aspects of ritual activity are accounted for, these emotions promote 
further reflection, e.g. concerning the relation between a participant and their com-
munity. In short, religion is still about thinking – sometimes in propositions, and at 
other times in images.
Enactivism: cognition as enaction
Enactivism as a separate paradigm within cognitive science emerged in the early 
1990s, and its classical exposition was supplied by Francisco Varela, Evan Thomp-
son, and Eleanor Rosch. In the authors’ account, “[c]ognition is not the representation 
of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but [...] the enactment of a world and a mind 
21 R.N. McCauley, E.T. Lawson, E. Thomas, Bringing Ritual to Mind, Cambridge 2004, pp. 4 ff.
22 Ibidem, pp. 26 ff.
23 See e.g. H. Whitehouse, Arguments and Icons. Divergent Modes of Religiosity, Oxford 2000.
24 See E. Tulving, Episodic and Semantic Memory [in:] Organization of Memory, E. Tulving, 
W. Donaldson (eds.), New York 1972, pp. 381–402.
25 H. Whitehouse, J.A. Lanman, The Ties That Bind Us: Ritual, Fusion, and Identification, “Current 
Anthropology” 2014, 55(6), pp. 674–695.
136
on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs.”26 
This is a fairly general statement that allows for a variety of interpretations, some of 
which may not be much different from the cognitivist stance.27 Therefore some quali-
fication is needed to establish what enaction really means. A valuable account of en-
activism was provided in 2010 by Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Marieke Rohde, and Hanne 
De Jaegher,28 who describe the fivefold core of the enactive approach. At first, they 
list autonomy, meaning that a cognitive system is operationally closed, it sets up the 
rules of its own activity (rather than being innately equipped with them) and engages 
with the environment as an agent. The last statement means that a system not only 
reacts to stimuli, but it also participates in a dynamic exchange with its milieu, deter-
mining the conditions thereof. According to this view, cognition involves continuous 
feedback between the agent and its surroundings, rather than internal processing of 
passively received information.
As the second element, the authors list sense-making, meaning that through cog-
nitive activity systems “cast a web of significance”29 on their world by specifying the 
features they detect. The notion of significance may cause some confusion, as not all 
strands of enactivism endorse the view that all cognitive processes involve generation 
of meaning. However, what is agreed upon is that “sense is not an invariant present 
in the environment that must be retrieved [...] [but] the outcome of the dialog between 
[...] organisms in action and the dynamics of the environment.”30
The central pillar of enactivism is the notion of emergence. A property is emergent 
when, rather than characterising one or more elements of a system, it arises as a result 
of the interconnection and interaction between those elements. Should even a sin-
gle element be removed, the property wanes. In other words, the property does not 
have an ontological status separate from the processes that constitute it. According 
to Di Paolo et al., a system’s autonomy is an emergent property – an agent’s precar-
ious identity arises out of ongoing processes. Meaning is also emergent, as it can be 
found neither in the environment nor in the internal dynamics of the agent, but [in] 
“the relational domain established between the two.”31 Along these lines, the mind 
“emerges from the self-organizing and self-creating activities of living organisms.”32 
Not only is it a process rather than a virtual apparatus, but it is also an ongoing result 
of cognitive activities rather than a pregiven faculty making these activities possible. 
To underscore this claim over again, enaction implies that what is mental emerges in 
the process of bodily presence and animation within an environment.
26 E. Varela, E.T. Thompson, E. Resch, op. cit., p. 9.
27 For an in­depth discussion of the gradation of relations between enactivism and cognitivism, see 
D.D. Hutto, E. Myin, op. cit.
28 E.A. Di Paolo, M. Rohde, H. De Jaegher, Horizons for the Enactive Mind: Values, Social Inter-
action, and Play [in:] Enaction. Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, 
E.A. Di Paolo (eds.), Cambridge, MA 2010, pp. 33–87.
29 Ibidem, p. 39.
30 Ibidem, pp. 39–40.
31 Ibidem, p. 40.
32 D.D. Hutto, E. Myin, op. cit., p. 32.
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Special attention should be given to the notion of embodiment underlying the 
enactive stance, as it may easily be underestimated. To claim that cognition is em-
bodied does not simply mean that the body is the mind’s extension (i.e. an external 
tool aiding cognition) or a vessel for the mind alternative (or complementary) to the 
brain. The embodiment of mind and cognition implies that what is mental emerges 
in the process of bodily animation within an environment. As Gilbert Ryle grace-
fully put it over six decades ago, “‘the mind is [not] its own place’ [...] for the mind 
is not even a metaphorical ‘place’. On the contrary, the chessboard, the platform, the 
scholar’s desk, the judge’s bench, the lorry-driver’s seat, the studio and the football 
field are among its places, [as t]hese are where people work and play stupidly or 
intelligently.”33 In the words of Hutto and Myin, minds are not merely extended, but 
extensive (i.e. fundamentally and constitutively world-involving).34
The final item on Di Paolo et al.’s list is experience as the source of cognitive pro-
ficiency. Systems become efficient agents not by virtue of being equipped or having 
gained information about their milieu, but through undergoing transformation in the 
process of enacting the relation with it.
Enactivism and representation
The relationship between enactivism and representationalism is ambiguous, as differ-
ent authors present different stances towards the problem of (representational) con-
tent. The present discussion is best suited with so-called Radical Embodied Cogni-
tion (REC),35 as it provides the most stripped-down foundation for reconstructing the 
understanding of religion.
According to Hutto and Myin, basic cognition (any process involving intention-
ality) and basic mentality (any process involving intentionality and phenomenality) 
do not involve content, i.e. are non-representional. Basic cognition does not involve 
meaning (the agents’ interactions with the environment do not “say” anything about 
this environment), and it is non-propositional (it is not intrinsically true or false).36 
This is not to deny that representation-based cognition actually occurs, but to stress 
that there is a vast realm of cognitive processes that do not involve content manipula-
tion. These basic processes must be accounted for if a comprehensive understanding 
of cognition is to be established.
When it comes to high-level cognition, involving manipulation of representations 
and fixation of beliefs, it is secondary with respect to basic processes. It requires 
33 G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, London 2009 [1949], p. 38.
34 D.D. Hutto, E. Myin, op. cit., pp. 135 ff.
35 Ibidem.
36 This proposal is grounded in some significant advancements in robotics, made e.g. by R. Brooks 
and R.D. Beer (ibidem, pp. 41 ff.). Rather than basing his robot’s actions on pre-planned models, 
Brooks had them perform tasks by frequently sampling features of their milieu and guiding their re-
sponses accordingly. This approach resulted in the robots’ coherent, intelligent actions without generating 
their intermediary representations. Separate, centralised computational processes proved unnecessary.
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the development of scaffolded minds, erected on extensive basic minds.37 Content- 
-involving cognition, resembling the central processes described by Fodor, requires 
the mastering of scaffolded practices, involving complex interactions with the envi-
ronment and acquisition of language. In a nutshell, cognition is enaction (i.e. con-
tinuous bringing forth of an environment through interaction with it), which may 
potentially be followed by theorising (i.e. processing propositional content). To put 
this claim as succinctly as possible, “[w]e act before we think.”38
Enactivists are first to admit that although their approach is very good at explain-
ing basic processes, it is still at loss when it comes to accounting for scaffolded 
cognition. However, in the past decades theories have emerged of the embodied basis 
of concept formation, which seem compatible with the enactive approach. The first 
is Mark Johnson’s theory,39 according to which concepts are erected on the basis 
of image schemata, i.e. non-propositional, pre-conceptual structures abstracted from 
recurrent perceptuo-motor programmes. Image schemata are dynamic (they alter de-
pending on the situation) and malleable (they may be adapted to novel situations). 
Although the most general of them are universal, individual sets of available sche-
mata may vary depending on the history of one’s perceptuo-motor experience. Image 
schemata could be seen as the minimum content mediating between basic and scaf-
folded cognition. They are the pre-conceptual representations of varieties of motion 
and sensation, out of which fully fledged concepts may be built. The notion of image 
schemata (or equivalent structures) underlies Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of con-
ceptual metaphor40 and Ronald Langacker’s project of cognitive grammar,41 which 
derives all grammatico-lexical structures from perceptuo-motor schemata. The work 
undertaken by Vittorio Gallese with George Lakoff in the past decade aimed to show 
what may be the neurophysiological correlates of the formation of image schemata.42 
Based on their theory of neural exploitation, according to which the mechanisms 
originally developed to control sensorimotor activity took on the role of controlling 
conceptual and linguistic processes, the authors proposed a model of how concepts of 
natural languages (cogs) may be abstracted from the sensorimotor stimuli provided 
by the interaction with the environment. 
To summarise the above, according to the radical enactive account, the major-
ity of cognitive processes do not involve formation and manipulation of represen-
tations. And when these representations do arise, it is not according to algorithms 
bestowed upon us with birth, but in relation to templates provided by our ongoing 
interaction with the world. These templates are dynamic and context-sensitive, and as 
such may change depending on particular conditions of enaction.
37 Ibidem, pp. 151 ff.
38 Ibidem, p. 121.
39 See M. Johnson, The Body in the Mind. The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason, 
Chicago 1987.
40 G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, Chicago 1980.
41 R.W. Langacker, Cognitive Grammar. A Basic Introduction, Oxford 2008.
42 V. Gallese, G. Lakoff, The Brain’s Concepts: The Role of the Sensory-Motor System in Conceptual 
Knowledge, “Cognitive Neuropsychology” 2005, 22(3–4), pp. 455–479.
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Religion according to enactivism?
The foregoing summary of the enactive stance allows for an introductory reflection 
on how the notion of religion might be re-established. What follows is merely a list 
of points which need to be taken into consideration, and which stand in opposition to 
the cognitivist take on religion. 
First, the search for a single, fixed evolutionary recipe for religion is most likely 
futile. The character of the coupling between an agent and its (physico-biologico-
cultural) milieu, and varying modes of enaction related to this coupling, will influ-
ence the emerging religious concepts differently. This does not mean that certain 
universal traits of religious representations cannot be postulated, but narrowing the 
discussion to these traits impoverishes the view on religion.
Moreover, as the character of the said coupling changes, so will, eventually, reli-
gious concepts. This may happen over centuries, over the span of a single lifetime or 
even of a single ritual. Where there may seem to be one religious concept, there may 
in fact be plenty of them, showing varying coherence with one another, depending 
on the situation.
Next, religion – just like cognition or mind – should be conceived as a process 
rather than a system of concepts. Constant emergence is its very nature. Undoubt-
edly, conceptual systems aimed at stabilising this precarious process are at work. 
Notions of orthodoxy and orthopraxy serve to regulate the current of experiences and 
representations that accompany religious processes. But codified doctrines form just 
a small part of what religion is, and they may become irrelevant in many contexts.43
Next, if contentful cognition is just “the tip of the cognitive iceberg,”44 one should 
not begin the search for cognitive explanations of religion at the level of content ma-
nipulation, but at the level of basic cognition. Through intentional interactions with 
the environment patterns of enaction emerge, which provide the basis for concept 
formation. The rudimentary perceptuo-motor experiences of actors immersed in an 
environment provide the grounds for the emergence of concepts of divinity, salvation 
and the like. Thus, these perceptuo-motor experiences must be studied carefully.
Importantly, if the foundations of religion are laid at the level of basic cognition 
and basic mentality, the notion of truth-value is initially irrelevant. First come enac-
tion and experience. Only then can there be concept formation and, finally, evaluation 
of these concepts. Hence thinking about religion in terms of commitment to concepts 
that are untrue is an overestimation of intellectualism that characterises only a fairly 
small part of religion.
Next, the enactive approach forces one to reconsider the role of ritual in the emer-
gence of religion. Ritual activities should be accounted for mainly as the enactive 
43 This last point has already been made by cognitivists Justin Barrett (J.L. Barrett, Theological 
Correctness, “Method and Theory in the Study of Religion” 1999, 199(11), pp. 325–339) and Harvey 
Whitehouse (H. Whitehouse, op. cit.), when they described the breaches of theological correctness, and 
the imagistic mode of religiosity, respectively. But their conclusions, grounded in staunch representation-
alism, do not seem to provide a profound enough interpretation of their observations.
44 D.D. Hutto, E. Myin, op. cit., p. 46.
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basis for the formation of religious concepts, not only as their stabiliser. This does 
not mean that all forms of ritual enaction necessarily precede religious beliefs. There 
is clearly a feedback loop between religious representations and the forms of activity 
related to them. But one should accept that, to a considerable degree, it is the ritual 
that shapes religious concepts.
Once religious concepts are discussed, they should not be limited to concepts of 
entities (deities, ancestors and such), but should also include concepts of activities 
and processes. To give a general example, in different cultures various notions of so-
teriology take a central place, and soteriological goals are achieved through engaging 
in processes of various complexity and length. Diminishing the significance of those 
processes to focus only on the agents involved with them is unacceptable.
Finally, if religion is an emergent phenomenon, a precarious product of numerous 
interactions between humans and their milieu, it is virtually impossible to get a com-
prehensive understanding of what religion is by devising experiments and taking 
measurements in the lab. It is fine to study people’s ability to memorise doctored nar-
ratives about gods, or to teach subjects meditation techniques to see how their brains 
react. But the outcomes of such pursuits will not bring us much closer to explaining 
religion, as religion taken out of its context is religion no more.
Before closing this discussion with a short example from Hindu ritual studies, 
a comment is needed on an existing alternative proposal within cognitive study of 
religion. Armin W. Geertz is known to contest the classical CSR stance, and to en-
dorse embodied cognition. His assumptions, however, are not enactivist in spirit, and 
therefore his approach has to be seen as distinct from what is proposed here.
Devising his biocultural theory of religion, Geertz acknowledges that cognition is 
“embrained, embodied, encultured, extended and distributed.”45 He points to the in-
terconnection between central nervous system (the limbic system and the pre-frontal 
cortex) and the endocrine system, to argue that “bodily processes and stimuli, emo-
tions and feelings, higher order cognition... are connected” and therefore acting upon 
one element of this network affects the rest.46 He observes that “manipulating” bodily 
states, e.g. during ritual, can “change and direct our minds.”47 By making this obser-
vation, he stresses the importance of taking the sensorimotor experience into consid-
eration. He also argues against the simplified cognitivist model, proposing instead to 
bravely deal with “a jumble of factors almost impossible to tease out into analytically 
meaningful units, theories and hypotheses.”48 Yet still, his conclusions are based on 
a model of cognition different from the one summarised here.
Geertz advocates the thesis that cognition is simply extended, not extensive – 
the brain’s governance over the body allows the former to apply the latter as a tool 
necessary for the development of the mind. The mental, therefore, is not out there, 
as Ryle might put it, in the interaction between an agent and its milieu, but some-
where in there. It is a virtual object simply provided with – and developed through 
45 A.W. Geertz, op. cit., p. 304.
46 Ibidem, pp. 306–307.
47 Ibidem, p. 307.
48 Ibidem, p. 305.
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– a reciprocal connection with external tools in the form of the body and its environ-
ment. Distributed cognition, i.e. cognition “inextricably enmeshed in emotional and 
semantic networks,”49 is not enaction – it is supported by enaction. Finally, Geertz’s 
view is essentially a representationalist one. He understands embodied cognition as 
“the use of perceptual, motor and spatial representations – representations of the body 
and the physical world – to facilitate cognition.”50 There is no acknowledgement that 
multiple forms of intentional relations with the environment are contentless, that nu-
merous guided responses to the environment actually do not involve representing.
To what extent these differences in basic assumptions influence the final interpre-
tations of religious phenomena remains to be seen. Can starting off with basic, con-
tentless cognition to look for sources or religious patterns of behaviour and thought 
bring results different from those obtained by starting off with embodied representa-
tions? Will treating the mind as an emergent process rather than an entity enmeshed 
in the body and its environment make any difference for the interpretation of culture in 
general and religion in particular? Or is applying a rigorous, radical enactive ap-
proach tantamount to adding an unnecessary, pretentious twist to an otherwise solid 
and fairly straightforward model? The answers to these questions can be sought as 
the enactive approach advances, and as its applicability within the study of religions 
is tested on concrete examples. The remaining part of the paper will be devoted to 
discussing an example that might provide an excellent opportunity to apply the enac-
tive stance.
Eat, digest, transform – modes of enaction in Suchitra Samanta’s 
interpretation of bali 
The following example is based on Suchitra Samanta’s analysis of the bali ritual 
performed at the Kālīghāt temple in Kolkata.51 Samanta’s study took place between 
1986 and 1992, and was based on observation of rituals, interviews with participants 
and analysis of textual sources. Bali (from the Sanskrit toot bhṛ – to support, protect, 
maintain) is a sacrificial practice. In its most common form (known as pāthābali), 
a black goat is consecrated and decapitated. Its meat is then cooked and offered 
as a meal (bhog) to the goddess Kālī, who is believed to ingest it through the modal-
ity sight (darśan). After being consumed by the goddess, the meat is offered to the 
sacrifier, to be eaten as prasād (grace).
Interestingly, the incantations recited during consecration (baliprakaran) express 
the goat’s desire to have its essence (bhāva), represented by blood, transformed into 
subuddhi (discriminative faculty of soteriological significance), and to have its animal 
bonds (paśupāśa) severed. A similar notion is present in tantric literature, describing 
49 Ibidem, p. 311.
50 Ibidem, p. 310.
51 S. Samanta, The ‘Self-Animal’ and Divine Digestion: Goat Sacrifice to the Goddess Kālī in Ben-
gal, “Journal of Asian Studies” 1994, 53(3), pp. 779–803.
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the transformation of the self, referred to as paśu (animal), through the process of 
pāka (digestion/cooking) in the bowels of time (kāla). Notably, in mythical narratives 
Kālī is depicted as a ferocious destroyer of demons, killing them through decapitation 
or ingestion of their blood. When these – and some other – factors are taken into con-
sideration, it seems that pāthābali is a part of a global soteriological process, in which 
gradual refinement of the substance of the phenomenal world occurs. This process 
is construed in the categories of very basic activities, namely eating and digesting. 
As a part of this process, the discussed ritual is aimed at ridding the sacrifier of their 
ignorant animal/demonic nature (paśubhāva, āsurikbhāva) through the process of 
ingestion and digestion by a deity.
Notably, it is not the deity herself that is the most central element of the dis-
cussed set of concepts, but the process she effectuates. To put it crudely, the ritual is 
not about appeasing the goddess, but about enabling the process of cosmic transfor-
mation. Significant elements of this process (ingesting, digesting, defecating, being 
nourished, but also cooking, engaging in animal slaughter and warfare), experienced 
both during and outside of the ritual context, provide the enactive basis for the under-
standing of the entire system.
Another interesting element of the example concerns the roles ascribed to the ac-
tors in the ritual spectacle. As the process progresses, different identifications emerge 
and the roles change. The goat, through consecration, is identified with the sacrifier. 
As it is slain, it is reduced to paśubhāva, the sacrifier’s ignorant, demonic essence. 
After being cooked it becomes the meal of the goddess and, as she symbolically 
digests it, it is turned into the divine essence (śakti, subuddhi), consubstantial with 
Kālī herself. When consumed as prasād, it acts – as the divine principle – upon the 
sacrifier, inducing his or her transformation. All in all, at different points of the ritual 
the identities of the agent, the patient and the instrument change, depending on which 
part of the process becomes prominent. In other words, the process itself structures 
the relations between its elements.
To sum up, in the discussed example the groundwork for the entire conceptual 
system is found at the level of very basic processes and activities and the sensorimo-
tor experience related to them. There is definitely feedback between these activities 
and doctrinal notions, which contributes to the wholesomeness of the system; with-
out the enacted context, though, these notions remain incomprehensible. An impor-
tant question that should be asked, however, is where religion begins in this puzzle. 
Is it at a level of complex conceptualisations, simply borrowing from the experience 
of eating and digesting to create a convincing, durable metaphor? Or at the level of 
the experience itself, series of contentless enactions that, through continuation and 
repetition, begin to produce pre-conceptual schemata, which in order offer them-
selves up to construal, resulting in the formation of concepts and narratives? I would 
opt for the second possibility, and suggest that, in the discussed example, the animal 
is not slain, cooked and eaten for religious reasons. It is the act of slaying, cooking 
and eating that awakens the urge for religious explanations. Certainly, these concep-
tualisations feed the loop and initiate subsequent rituals. But the loop continues due 
to the unstoppable need to act rather than due to belief in gods. Because first we are 
actors and experiencers, and only then are we thinkers.
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